CHENG v. COMMONWEALTH
240 Va. 26,393 S.E.2d 599 (1990) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 17
Fall 11-1-1990
CHENG v. COMMONWEALTH 240 Va. 26,393
S.E.2d 599 (1990)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, Va. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
CHENG v. COMMONWEALTH 240 Va. 26,393 S.E.2d 599 (1990), 3 Cap. Def. Dig. 20 (1990).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol3/iss1/17
Capital Defense Digest - Page 20
must approve the jury's sentence in Virginia, the victim impact state-
ment is improper under Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), which
held that the reading of victim impact statements to sentencing juries
creates an unacceptable risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing. This
position was reiterated in South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S.Ct. 2207
(1989), which stressed that information concerning the victim not
connected to the crime itself is constitutionally irrelevant in that it does
not bear on the moral culpability of the defendant. The Smith court held
it is within the judge's power to view victim impact statements, based on
the belief that a judge will be able to lay feelings of passion or emotion
aside when deciding whether or not to impose the jury's sentence.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
It should be noted that the court's rejection of diminished capacity
coexists with cases recognizing intoxication as a defense to first degree
murder.Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524,115 S.E.2d 673 (1923)
held that someone who was so intoxicated at the time of the murder that
he was unable to premeditate (i.e., adopt a specific design or plan to kill
the victim), cannot be convicted of first degree murder. Fitzgerald v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615,295 S.E.2d 798 (1982), demonstrates this
case law is still valid in Virginia. In Fitzgerald, a capital murder defen-
dant was permitted to advance the diminished capacity/voluntary intoxi-
cation defense and support it with testimony from expert witnesses. The
Virginia Supreme Court said his ability to premeditate was "an issue of
fact to be resolved by the jury". Id. at 632, 295 S.E.2d 807. Smith does
not overrule this line of cases, and both interpretations are currently
within the body of valid state law. Attorneys should continue to avail
themselves of the earlier, more helpful interpretation of premeditation
and diminished capacity/voluntary intoxication defense.
Defense counsel raised a number of issues pretrial and preserved
others during the trial for appellate review. As to other issues, however,
the court found procedural waivers and defaults. Two issues the court
found waived or defaulted illustrate the importance of renewing ob-
jections in some circumstances. An objection to the qualification of a
prospective alternate juror was lost for failure to renew at the time the
jury was empanelled. Another objection concerning the admissibility of
certain testimony of a forensic expert lost because objection was not
renewed after prosecution argued the issue and the witness continued to
testify.
The Sandstrom objection to the court's malice instruction illustrates
the importance of raising even issues that are virtually certain to lose in
state court, and raising them on federal constitutional grounds. See
Avoiding Procedural Default, this issue. In addition, when the Virginia
Supreme Court is forced to rule on federal constitutional matters, it must
address them in the published the record, and this helps the reported
opinions alert other defense counsel to the presence of these issues.
Summary and analysis by:
Peter Hansen
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Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
A Circuit Court jury in Arlington, Virginia, convicted Dung
Quang Cheng of capital murder pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-31 (a)
(now 1) and § 18.2-31(d) (now 4), abduction, robbery, conspiracy to
commit abduction, robbery ormurder, use ofa firearm in the commission
of robbery, abduction, or murder; and possession of a "sawed-off'
shotgun.
On September 3, 1988, Mohamad Amir overheard Dung Cheng
tell two other accomplices that he planned to rob a restaurant. One
accomplice testified that he saw a shotgun in a brown bag at Cheng's
house on September 3rd and had seen Cheng with a pistol the week
before.
All three men went to the Grand Garden Restaurant in McLean,
Virginia which was co-owned by Hsaing "Freddie" Liu. Cheng handed
a note containing his name and telephone number to a receptionist and
directed her to deliver the note to Liu. The men waited for approximately
one-half hour and then departed without seeing Liu.
The next day Cheng informed his accomplices that he again
planned to rob a restaurant. He instructed them to bring a jeep and the
shotgun. The men drove to one of the accomplice's house to pick up a
jeep and then made a brief stop at Cheng's house to allow him to retrieve
a brown bag.
At about 10:00 p.m. that night, Cheng was seen talking to Liu at
the Grand Garden Restaurant. Cheng departed after their brief conver-
sation. At 11:30 Liu, taking his briefcase, left the Grand Garden
Restaurant in his automobile.
The next morning, the Arlington Police discovered Liu's body
between the front and back seat of his car. Liu's hands were tied behind
his back, and he had been shot in the head four times. The police could
find neither Liu's briefcase nor his wallet at the scene of the crime. The
back pocket where Liu usually carried his wallet was untucked.
A police officer testified that the position of the bullet casings led
him to believe that two shots were fired from the front seat, and two were
fired from a position above Liu and outside the vehicle. An autopsy was
performed; however, it was impossible to determine the sequence in
which the shots were fired. The report did note that two of the shots to
the head region were fatal.
The only pieces of evidence found at the scene were a blood
soaked piece of paper containing Cheng's name, address and license
plate number, some cigarettebutts, and an unidentifiedpartial fingerprint.
Two days later, the ArlingtonPolice located Cheng'sjeep in Washington,
D.C. The police impounded the vehicle, seizing a shotgun, a Marlboro
cigarette box, a briefcase and an American Express credit card receipt
signed by Liu.
On September 9th, two days after impounding Cheng's vehicle,
Arlington County Deputy Sheriff, Suwit Yon Kwan, visited Cheng in
jail. Kwan and Cheng had met and become friends six years earlier when
they worked at a restaurant. During their conversation, Cheng stated that
"he didn't do it." Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d. 599,
603 (1990). On direct examination, Officer Kwan testified that when
Cheng later expressed his desire to confess, Kwan advised him to speak
with his attorney before making any additional statements. Kwan further
testified that despite this warning Cheng stated that they had no chdice
but to kill Liu because he had a contract out on Cheng. Id. 393 S.E.2d at
608. Furthermore, Cheng stated that the police would not find anything
at the scene of the crime because the only thing that he left was from his
cigarette.
HOLDING
A divided Supreme Court of Virginia held that there was insuffi-
cient evidence that Cheng was in fact the triggerman. Excluding murder-
for-hire, the Virginia legislature has limited the death eligible class of
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defendants to actual perpetrators. Because this was notamurder-for-hire
prosecution, the Commonwealth had to prove that Cheng was the
triggerman in order to obtain a capital conviction. Va Code Ann. § 18.2-
31(2) (1990); E.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 146, 149, 255
S.E.2d 525, 527, (1979) cert. denied 454 U.S. 920 (1981). While the
confession and the circumstantial evidence permitted an inference that
Cheng was the triggerman, the court noted that a mere probability or
suspicion of defendant's guilt is insufficient. Because the evidence was
insufficient to maintain a capital conviction, the court reversed the
judgement and the death sentence, remanding the case for a new trial on
a charge no greater than first degree murder.
The Virginia Supreme Court's opinion stated that several grounds
for appeal were not available to the defense because the alleged errors
either had not been preserved at trial or had not been properly raised on
appeal. The court refused to hear a prosecutorial misconduct challenge,
basing its decision on counsel's failure to request cautionary instructions
and an untimely delay in moving for a mistrial. Furthermore, the court
refused to address Cheng's claim that he was prejudiced by the trial
court's refusal to allow certain witnesses to testify because the witnesses'
testimony had not been proffered and preserved on the record. The court
also refused to consider several assigned errors because they were
neither briefed or argued on appeal. Lastly, the court refused to consider
an alleged error in the jury instructions because of a failure to assign error
until the appeal.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The court handled several issues raised on appeal in a conclusory
manner and dismissed them with very little discussion. Other issues
turned on facts peculiar to this case, including joinder, admissibility of
confession, venue, conspiracy, and seizure of items from the jeep.
Consequently, these grounds of appeal are not discussed in this summary.
(A) Sufficiency of the Evidence:
Although several issues addressed in Cheng may have implica-
tions forcapital defendants inVirginia, the holding regarding sufficiency
of evidence to convict a defendant of capital murder is the most
significant. This is only the third time the Virginia Supreme Court has
reversed a capital sentence imposed under the modem statute. The past
reversals include Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370,345 S.E.2d 267
(1986) (reversing forprosecutorial comments which tended to minimize
the jury's responsibility in fixing the sentence); and Justus v. Com-
monwealth, 220 Va. 971,266 S.E.2d 87 (1980) (reversing the conviction
because of an error in the jury selection). The evidence in this case led
to a strong presumption that Cheng was involved in the homicide. Cheng
expressed an intent to commit robbery. The evidence showed that he
masterminded the plan and had access to a shotgun and pistol. However,
officer Kwan's testimony only established that Cheng was involved in
the criminal activity. On direct examination, Kwan testified that Cheng
said that they had to get rid of Liu. However, on cross examination,
Kwan read from an earlier transcript of his testimony where he said that
Cheng did not say he was directly involved but that "he [Cheng] had to
do it." Cheng, 393 S.E.2d at 608. On the basis of this evidence and the
fact that there were three participants, the court concluded that the jury
could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Cheng was
the triggerman. The Virginia Supreme Court specifically noted that a
suspicion of guilt, no matter how strong, was insufficient to convict
Cheng of capital murder.
This standard of proof is not limited to triggerman situations. It is
a rule of general applicability. The Commonwealth must introduce
evidence that proves all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Defense counsel may question prospective jurors concerning
their ability to follow this standard of proof as compared to the standards
of raising a suspicion or proof by a preponderance of evidence. Also, the
strength of the evidence presented against Cheng which did not meet the
minimum standard of proof may provide a useful comparison in future
cases for motions to strike the Commonwealth's evidence.
(B) Procedural Bars
The Virginia Supreme Court refused to hear or consider several
grounds of appeal because of procedural errors. If reversal had not been
obtained through the insufficienttriggerman evidence, then these grounds
of appeal would have become much more important and their subse-
quent bar could have affected Cheng's defense significantly.
The court refused to hear assignments relating to alleged
prosecutorial misconduct during cross examination and closing argu-
ments. The court based its decision on counsel's failure to request
cautionary instructions and delay in moving for a mistrial. An appeal
will not be considered unless the counsel makes a timely motion for
cautionary instructions or for a mistrial. Motions for mistrial must be
made before the jury retires. Id. 393 S.E.2d at 606.
Secondly, the court would not address the trial court's refusal to
allow certain defense witnesses to testify for lack of an adequate record.
The court specifically noted that the defense counsel did not attempt to
call the witnesses or proffer their testimony.
Third, the court refused to entertain eight alleged errors because
they were neither briefed nor argued on appeal. While these errors had
been raised at trial and assigned as error for appeal, all eight were barred
from consideration because they had not been briefed or argued on
appeal.
Conversely, an alleged error in the jury instructions was briefed on
appeal; however, the court refused to rule on this question because error
was not assigned to the trial court jury instructions. Thus, the fourth
procedural bar resulted from a failure to assign error on an issue that was
briefed and argued on appeal.
In summary, the strength of the triggerman evidence found
insufficient in this case is a benchmark against which the prosecution's
case may be measured respecting all elements of the offense. Further-
more, scrupulous attention should be paid to Virginia procedure in order
to preserve errors for state and federal appellate review (See Powley,
Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue).
Summary and analysis by:
Steven K. Hemdon
